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become our objective. Equality is easiest to achieve not by equal 
assistance, whatever that may mean, but by not assisting religion at 
all. It is this equality in each religion's relationship with govern-
ment which enables our religions-both majority and minority, of 
differing sizes, wealth and membership-to confront each other as 
equals. The equality among our religions fostered by the separa-
tionist principle has nurtured religious pluralism. 
At this writing, there are more than 1200 religions and sects in 
the United States.23 With this new and ever-growing religious di-
versity,24 a moral consensus is more elusive than ever. For 
Goldberg and others, this stands as an indictment of today's society. 
Yet the diversity would seem to stand for an altogether different 
message. As Madison found, it is evidence of America's ever-grow-
ing religious freedom2s-a freedom that requires independence 
from government. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION: By Kenneth F. Rip-
ple.! Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie Company. 1984. Pp. 
xxii, 674. $50.00. 
Brian K. Landsberg 2 
Constitutional law, perhaps more than any other body of law, 
has long been the preserve of the legal theorist. If "the lot of the 
constitutional theorist is not easy,"3 the lot of the lawyer who must 
merge theory and practice to litigate a constitutional case is even 
more difficult. 
Ripple attempts to improve the lot of the litigator facing his 
first foray into a realm which intimidates even veterans. Ripple's 
treatise is, to my knowledge, the first effort to create a constitutional 
law practitioner's primer. It must, however, compete with more en-
compassing treatises which between them cover most of the same 
23. J. MELTON, A DIRECTORY OF RELIGIOUS BoDIES IN THE UNITED STATES xiii 
(1977). 
24. See Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 (1963) (comparing a relatively homo-
geneous religious composition during the time of the Founders with its evolving modem 
diversity). 
25. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351-52 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
I. Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. 
2. Visiting Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. 
Chief, Appellate Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice; on leave 
1984-85. The Department, of course, bears no responsibility for what is said here. 
3. Auerbach, Book Review, I CONST. COMM. 137, 163 (1984). 
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ground.4 Ripple's chronological treatment of the development of a 
constitutional case and his practical approach to each stage of litiga-
tion may prove useful to many practitioners who resist the thematic 
method of the hornbooks. One reader recommends this $50 text be 
"included in the library of any law firm that engages in constitu-
tionallitigation."s Others may question the usefulness of any dis-
cussion of constitutional law practice divorced from substance. 
This review will address four questions about Ripple's effort to 
divorce practice from substance. First, can one really instruct on 
how to litigate constitutional cases without writing a full-fledged 
text on the substance of constitutional law? Ripple's effort, though 
occasionally flawed, suggests that it can be done. Second, who can 
benefit from such a text? Both institutional lawyers and lawyers 
with a private practice representing individuals or corporations may 
need guidance on constitutional litigation. While Ripple's book 
provides some insights which would benefit both classes of lawyer, 
the plaintiff's lawyer in private practice will find more help there 
than will the institutional or defense lawyer. Third, what does close 
examination of the primer reveal about its depth and helpfulness in 
instructing the practitioner as to the specifics of litigation strategy? 
Review of Ripple's chapter on the choice of state or federal forum 
yields a mixed conclusion. Finally, do the differences between con-
stitutional and nonconstitutionallitigation warrant a separate text? 
Perhaps. The lawyer uneasy over a maiden voyage into the seas of 
constitutional litigation will find here useful charts to each port of 
call. More complete charts exist, but not in one place. 
I 
Ripple recognizes that a practitioner preparing to litigate a 
constitutional case needs familiarity with constitutional theory. His 
solution to the problem of reconciling the need for a theoretical base 
and the demands of a practical guide is twofold. He begins with an 
introductory unit on the "Basic Characteristics of Constitutional 
Litigation." He then selectively illustrates practical points with 
substantive case studies. This approach does not, however, allow 
these substantive issues to be covered in depth. Ripple's discussion 
of intent in constitutional cases illustrates this difficulty. 
Although intent is an element of many common law and statu-
4. See, e.g., today's standard hornbooks on constitutional law [J. NOWAK, R. Ro-
TUNDA & J. YOUNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1984); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW (1978)], federal courts (C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTS (1976)] and civil 
rights (S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION (1983)]. 
5. Levitan, Book Review, 70 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1984, at 140, 142. 
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tory causes of action, it poses special problems in the context of a 
constitutional challenge. Those problems flow from the fact that 
the Court requires proof of the government's intent, not just the 
intent of some individual. The Court itself has often recognized the 
difficulties attending any effort to show legislative intent, and it con-
tinues to eschew an intent requirement in litigation under some 
clauses of the Constitution. As a leading proponent of the intent 
requirement for race or sex discrimination noted, in rejecting a 
search for actual intent in a commerce clause challenge, an intent 
requirement "assumes that individual legislators are motivated by 
one discernible 'actual' purpose, and ignores the fact that different 
legislators may vote for a single piece of legislation for widely differ-
ent reasons."6 
Ripple cites only three types of cases requiring proof of intent: 
cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, under the fifteenth amendment, and 
under the equal protection and due process (incorporating free 
speech) clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 1 One might quibble 
about these examples. Section 1981 is not the Constitution. Even 
in equal protection litigation under the fourteenth amendment to 
remedy vote dilution caused by malapportionment, no showing of 
intent is required. 
But more basic questions must be asked, and Ripple provides 
no meaningful discussion of their answers. Do other clauses of the 
Constitution require proof of intent?s And how is intent to be 
proved? Ripple addresses the latter question in cursory fashion re-
lying primarily on quotes from three leading cases.9 These refer-
ences are helpful. Perhaps given the nature of the task Ripple has 
undertaken they suffice. But at the least it would have been helpful 
to discuss, for example, why the showing of disproportionate im-
pact was sufficient in Castaneda v. Partida,w but not in Arlington 
Heights. (Presumably discrimination was a more probable explana-
tion for the statistics in the jury discrimination case.) Why was it 
6. Rehnquist, J., dissenting in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 
662, 702-03 (I 981 ). 
7. K. RIPPLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 265-273 (1984). 
8. See the running dialogue between Justices Brennan and Rehnquist in, e.g., Kassel 
(commerce clause) and United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) 
(equal protection challenge not based on suspect classification). See also Larson v. Valente, 
456 U.S. 228 (1982) (Brennan, for the majority, finds deliberate establishment of religion; 
White and Rehnquist, dissenting, argue discriminatory intent must be and has not been 
shown). 
9. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); and Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 
(1973). See K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 265-270. 
10. 430 u.s. 482 (1977). 
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insufficient in City of Mobile v. Bo/den,u but sufficient in a very 
similar fact situation in Rogers v. Lodge ?t2 (Because the proof in 
Rogers was aimed at showing legislative intent rather than simply a 
collection of factors?) 
Another example of the difficulty inherent in an effort to teach 
constitutional litigation without thorough exploration of theory lies 
in Ripple's chapter on remedies. Ripple offers practitioners this 
sound advice: "[T]he time to worry about the remedy is not after 
liability has been established but during the early stages of the liti-
gation."13 He explains, too, the tension between the so-called tai-
loring principle ("the nature of the violation determines the scope of 
the remedy")t4 and the traditional flexibility of equity.ts 
His discussion of structural injunctions provides information 
about the pros and cons of the planning technique and use of special 
masters.t6 But he omits explanation or even description of the theo-
retical underpinnings of the structural injunction. A practitioner 
attempting to formulate and support (or oppose) structural relief 
needs a theoretical framework within which to work. Central to 
this is the developing distinction between primary and secondary 
relief. Primary relief is aimed directly at the practice which offends 
the Constitution, while secondary relief reaches practices that have 
not been shown to violate the Constitution. Although the district 
court has "ample authority" to "address each element contributing 
to the violation," as well as enjoining the violation itself,t7 the prac-
titioner also should know that courts are attempting to develop 
principles governing the use of such secondary remedies. Most no-
table is Ruiz v. Estelle,ts where the court approved much of the 
structural decree against the Texas prison system. The court disap-
proved several items of secondary relief because they were "not de-
monstrably required to protect constitutional rights and intrude 
unduly on matters of state concern." Implicit in the R uiz opinion is 
a kind of doctrine of inadequacy of remedy: indirect, secondary re-
lief is warranted only where primary relief is demonstrably inade-
quate to assure compliance with constitutional standards. 
Again, greater emphasis on the theoretical and historical un-
derpinnings of constitutional law would have been helpful in chap-
II. 446 U.S. 525 (1980). 
12. 458 u.s. 613 (1982). 
13. K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 306. 
14. Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 16 (1971). 
15. K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 302-03; see also Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. I, 46-50 (1979). 
16. K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 314-318. 
17. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978). 
18. 679 F.2d 1115, 1126 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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ter 13 on "Plenary Review." This chapter not only touches on brief 
writing and oral argument but also devotes considerable space to a 
discussion of the uses of history in constitutional adjudication. Rip-
ple provides examples of the use of history in cases involving such 
disparate issues as jury trial, the religion clauses, and separation of 
powers. The chapter could be enhanced by more explicit explana-
tion of the various uses of history. For example, the religion cases 
sometimes use the fact that a practice has long been followed to 
validate it. Or, as Ripple says, "[T]o a very great extent, the 
Court's cases in this area during modem times are an attempt to 
distinguish those civil-ecclesiastical relationships which have a suc-
cessful 'track record' in American society from those that do not 
and that, consequently, may cause significant strife in a pluralistic 
society."I9 But except for a brief quote from an opinion showing 
concern for the framers' motives in adopting the religion clauses, 
Ripple does not point out that evidence of historical practice may 
also instruct us on the underlying purposes of the Constitution. 
The practitioner should know that history may be used either to 
help define constitutional values, to define particular practices disfa-
vored by the framers, or to shed light on which relationships "have 
a successful 'track record.' " Moreover, prior practice may either 
show what the Constitution embraced or what it was meant to repu-
diate. Finally, the practitioner could have benefited from pointers 
on researching constitutional history. 
II 
In offering us a text on constitutional litigation, Ripple is nec-
essarily suggesting that legal strategy and the shaping of a case from 
the very beginning can make a difference in the Supreme Court's 
application of the Constitution. If he is correct, the lawyer who 
handles an occasional case raising constitutional issues desperately 
needs a how-to-do-it primer-assuming a primer can tell us how to 
do it. For in most constitutional litigation, at least one of the par-
ties is an institutional litigant (e.g., the United States, a state or lo-
cal government, the NAACP Legal and Educational Defense Fund, 
the American Civil Liberties Union, the Pacific Legal Foundation). 
Those litigants begin with certain advantages: flexibility in selecting 
cases in which to seek constitutional review, constant exposure to 
Court trends, expertise not only in the substance and procedure of 
constitutional litigation but also in controlling timing, and resources 
to shape the facts-both adjudicative and constitutional. Some liti-
19. K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 484. 
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gants, recognizing the importance of expertise in constitutional liti-
gation, have planned elaborate strategies to effect long-range 
constitutional change. The modem paradigm is the NAACP's 
strategy to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson. More recently state attor-
neys general have become much more aware of the advantages of 
such strategies. 
To be sure, the institutional litigant also confronts disadvan-
tages. Awareness of those disadvantages may sharpen the ability of 
the private practitioner to litigate against an institutional opponent. 
In tum, the institutional lawyer could benefit from strategic insights 
stemming from understanding the unique setting in which she liti-
gates. Political realitie~ may require the lawyer for such a litigant 
to embrace a stance even though she recognizes it as detracting 
from the litigant's chances of success. Positions taken in one case 
constrain the institutional litigant in future cases. A change in posi-
tion may undermine credibility. A government lawyer may feel so 
confined by her institutional responsibilities that she will allow her-
self to be boxed into an untenable position. Indeed, Ripple, in his 
discussion of "position development and the problem of overkiH"2o 
provides the vivid example of the trial court argument of Assistant 
Attorney General Baldridge in the Steel Seizure Cases. One step at 
a time the district court's questioning led Baldridge to this 
denouement: 
The Court: So, when the sovereign people adopted the Constitution, it enumer-
ated the powers set up in the Constitution but limited the powers of the Congress 
and limited the powers of the judiciary, but it did not limit the powers of the Execu-
tive. Is that what you say? 
Mr. Baldridge: That is the way we read Article II of the Constitution. 
The exchange was reproduced in the steel companies' Supreme 
Court brief, and the Solicitor General's position in the case was 
weakened by the necessity to repudiate any claim that in an emer-
gency the President was not bound by the Constitution. Ripple 
draws a valuable lesson from the interchange (along with several 
other examples): "Perhaps the most important step counsel can take 
is to think through-in advance-the logical extension of the char-
acterization and determine what limitations must realistically be 
placed upon it."2t This advice applies with special force to the insti-
tutional litigant; it is not accidental that all the examples in this 
section involve over-argument by counsel for the government. It is 
easy for counsel concerned only with the case at hand to limit her 
argument to the position demanded by that case. Counsel for an 
20. /d. at 256-263. 
21. /d. at 262. 
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institutional litigant must take care not only to avoid giving the case 
away but also not to compromise the institutional position in future 
cases. She must identify in advance and with precision the point at 
which she will limit her argument. 
In addition to strategic information and fundamentals of con-
stitutional law helpful to a private litigant, Ripple seeks to direct the 
private litigant to ready sources of help. He suggests, for example, 
that a litigant leery of directly advancing a novel argument arrange 
for an institutional amicus curiae to do so.22 To that end he devotes 
a full chapter to "the amicus curiae in Supreme Court litigation." 
Ripple would have done well, however, to begin by responding to 
the notion that "[i]t is probably true that the Justices do not see 
most of the amicus curiae briefs that are filed with the Court. If 
that is so, the Court is playing a cruel hoax on those who request 
their counsel to file them. "23 
Moreover, the Court may look askance at efforts of an amicus 
to argue an issue not presented by the parties. Although the Court 
did adopt the suggestion of an amicus in Berry v. Doles, prudence 
dictates attention to Justice Powell's suggestion that 
the Court would be fully justified in holding that the United States, which is not a 
party to this suit and did not participate in the court below, is barred from injecting 
a new issue into the case by requesting the Court to grant relief that appellants 
themselves never have sought.24 
The case does tend to support Ripple's later point that the Solicitor 
General's influence as amicus is often great (but note that the Court 
may well grant greater deference to invited views, as in Berry, than 
to a volunteer).25 Yet, Justice Powell's point counsels tempering 
one's expectations of help from amici. The Solicitor General re-
cently made a similar point in the course of oral argument as ami-
cus curiae in an abortion case. Asked by Justice Blackmun why he 
was not asking that Roe v. Wade be overruled, the Solicitor General 
replied: "That is not one of the issues presented in this case, and as 
amicus appearing before the Court, that would not be a proper 
function for us. "26 
In sum, Constitutional Litigation offers help to both the institu-
tional and private lawyer, but primarily to the latter. The reader 
22. /d. at 503. 
23. Kurland & Hutchinson, The Business of the Supreme Court, 0. T. 1982, 50 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 628, 647 (1983). 
24. 438 u.s. 190, 199 (1978). 
25. K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 527. 
26. 138 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1982 TERM SUPPLEMENT 818 (P. Kurland & G. 
Casper ed. 1983). 
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who treats it as an introductory course will be off to a good start. 
The reader who ends his education there will be ill-served. 
III 
Having concluded that Ripple's book might be helpful to a pri-
vate litigant, as well as to an institutional litigant in certain circum-
stances, I thought it useful to consider Ripple's coverage and 
analysis in an area which would be of considerable importance to 
someone using the book-the issue of choice of state or federal 
forum. 
The brevity of chapter 5, "The Choice Between Federal and 
State Courts," may encourage the practitioner to slight this central 
issue. Ripple himself almost encourages this when he recites that 
the case law proceeds on the assumption that state and federal 
courts are equal, quoting two of the elder Justice Harlan's encomi-
ums to the then-fashionable doctrine of dual sovereignty.21 But as 
Paul Bator has pointed out, the Court has simultaneously followed 
two rhetorical traditions, one of equality between state and federal 
courts and one "running directly to the contrary."2s For example, 
the Court has consistently held that Congress intended to create a 
federal remedy, not dependent on state courts, when it enacted 42 
U.S.C. § 1983: "It is no answer that the State has a law which if 
enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to 
the state remedy, and the latter need not first be sought and refused 
before the federal one is invoked. "29 
While overstating the theory of equality of federal and state 
courts, Ripple also understates the potential advantages of mount-
ing one's constitutional challenge to a state law in state court. He 
correctly advises the practitioner to choose consciously between a 
state and federal forum where the law permits. The common sense 
factors he urges for consideration include comparative competence, 
attorney's fees, immunities, statutes of limitations and other such 
27. K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 141-42. 
28. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 605, 607 (1981). 
29. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). Similarly, the second Justice Harlan 
added that Congress held "the view that a deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly 
different from and more serious than a violation of a state right and therefore deserves a 
different remedy even though the same act may constitute both a state tort and the depriva-
tion of a constitutional right." Harlan, J., concurring, id. at 196. The Court most recently 
reaffirmed this view just three years ago: "[I}n passing [Section 1983], Congress assigned to 
the federal courts a paramount role in protecting constitutional rights." Patsy v. Board of 
Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982). The state courts do share with federal courts responsibil-
ity for applying the Constitution to cases before them; nonetheless, much of the law under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 rests on the premise that federal courts have a special role to play. 
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procedural issues. He also points out that available remedies may 
differ in the two court systems, and that the litigant may wish to 
invoke the state constitution or laws. However, while aware of the 
varying appellate routes, he neglects to inform the lawyer of the 
impact of this choice on appellate review. Not only may challeng-
ing the constitutionality of a state statute in state court entail an 
extra appellate level before United States Supreme Court review is 
available, the choice of forum will also affect the type of Supreme 
Court review available. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1254, a plaintiff chal-
lenging the constitutionality of a state law has this reason to prefer 
state court: if the plaintiff ultimately prevails in federal court, the 
defendant will be entitled to invoke the Supreme Court's mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction, but if plaintiff loses in federal court Supreme 
Court review is discretionary. However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 
the converse is true of a state court challenge: defeat in state court 
provides the plaintiff with mandatory appeal, while plainti1rs vic-
tory leaves certiorari as defendant's only recourse. Thus, other fac-
tors being equal (or even tilting toward a federal forum), the 
plaintiff may be better off mounting his constitutional challenge to a 
state law in a state forum, whether he expects to win or to lose in 
state court. True, some Justices will scarcely differentiate between 
an appeal and certiorari at the screening stage. The Court disposes 
of the majority of "mandatory" appeals summarily, generally by 
summary affirmance or by dismissal for want of a substantial fed-
eral question. Nonetheless, the Court hears a larger percentage of 
the appeals presented to it than of the certiorari petitions. The 
figures for the 1981 Term are not unusual. The Court noted prob-
able jurisdiction or set for argument twenty-six percent of the ap-
peals acted on that Term; it granted only five percent of the 
petitions for certiorari. Probably refinement of these figures would 
close the gap somewhat.3o The point remains that the appellate 
route may influence the likelihood of Supreme Court review. 
In discussing whether immunity of particular defendants 
should affect choice of forum, Ripple provides only one sentence: 
"It is also well-established that federal standards apply to questions 
of immunity," citing Martinez v. California.3I While Martinez does 
approvingly quote a lower court statement that violations of § 1983 
"cannot be immunized by state law," no case precludes a state from 
granting less immunity than federal law grants state officers charged 
with constitutional torts. A state may, for example, waive sovereign 
30. See K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 454-56; R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME 
COURT PRACTICE 260, 261 (5th ed. 1978); 1982 Repon of the Attorney Genera/ 7-8. 
31. 444 u.s. 277, 284 (1980). 
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immunity in state court without waiving its eleventh amendment 
immunity from federal court suit. Or it may subject a county to 
state court suit for constitutional torts even though the federal 
courts may not entertain such suits.32 These distinctions can be cru-
cial to the success of a constitutional action and deserve greater at-
tention than Ripple gives them. 
Ripple correctly observes that, after Pennhurst State School v. 
Halderman,33 "the existence of a strong state-based claim might 
well indicate that the state forum is the most advantageous." He 
might have added that the party who prevails on the state claim 
gains another advantage: the Supreme Court will not review a state 
court constitutional decision which rests on an adequate and in-
dependent state ground. The litigant who is more interested in win-
ning the case than in establishing federal constitutional doctrine 
thus has some chance of completely insulating his case from 
Supreme Court review if he prevails. 
Ripple pays scant attention to differences between state and 
federal procedure as an institutional factor influencing choice of fo-
rum. Perhaps, as he says, "the use of the federal rules, sometimes 
with adaptations, by many states has mitigated, substantially, differ-
ences in procedure. "34 Yet an eminent constitutional law practi-
tioner and teacher recently concluded that in New York, even 
assuming substantive parity, "the ease of drafting an acceptable and 
predictable federal pleading and the difficulty of drafting a predict-
able state pleading will naturally incline the lawyer toward federal 
court."Js 
One need only read Zorach v. C/auson,36 to appreciate this 
point. In the course of approving New York's program of releasing 
students during the school day so they could attend religious school 
the Court said: "If in fact coercion were used . . . a wholly differ-
ent case would be presented." The state courts, however, had ex-
cluded evidence of coercion on the ground that the issue had not 
been properly raised; under federal procedure the complaint would 
have sufficed to raise the issue. Since the state procedural ground 
presented no federal issue, the Supreme Court refused to review the 
32. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 
U.S. 693,710 n.27 (1973). Ripple does point out that the eleventh amendment applies only to 
federal court actions. 
33. 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). 
34. K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 148. 
35. Neubome, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY 
L. REv. 725, 739 (1981). 
36. 343 U.S. 306, 311 n.7 (1952). 
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exclusion of the evidence which, as the Court said, would have 
presented "a wholly different case." 
In short, Ripple raises some of the right questions, but in some 
instances does not explore them in sufficient depth to enable the 
reader to rely on this text exclusively. Worse, on occasion the text 
fails to provide any warning that seemingly definitive discussion is 
only a beginning point. 
IV 
Do the differences between constitutional litigation and other 
litigation warrant this separate text? After over twenty years of liti-
gating and teaching about both constitutional and statutory cases in 
the federal courts, I am not at all certain that the differences be-
tween the two are as great as the similarities. To be sure, analytical 
approaches to the uses of history, underlying values, stare decisis, 
legislative fact, and characterization may differ. Similarly, proce-
dures (for example, bases for Supreme Court review) may differ. 
On the other hand, the tools of litigation are basically identical, and 
one wonders whether Ripple's general approach of assuming consti-
tutional litigation's uniqueness doesn't camouflage attributes that 
all litigation shares. 
Ripple's book is at its best in describing differences that clearly 
exist. It is weakest in discussing more ephemeral distinctions. 
These strengths and weaknesses are apparent if one contrasts Rip-
ple's treatment of the Supreme Court's screening function, interim 
relief, characterization (attaching a theory to the facts), and stare 
decisis. 
Chapter 12 is an excellent summary of the Supreme Court's 
screening function which, however, exaggerates differences between 
constitutional and other litigation. Ripple states, 
Here . . . our focus is on the special concerns of the constitutional case. Reducing 
the constitutional case to manageable size-while still preserving a sharp focus on 
the values at stake--is no small task. The "eye of the needle" through which such a 
case must pass is indeed a small one and is shaped by many legal and extra-legal 
forces.37 
Ripple then explains the Court's appellate and certiorari jurisdic-
tion and its internal workings, concluding with very sound advice as 
to how to write an effective petition for certiorari or jurisdictional 
statement. However helpful the advice, it must be noted that sug-
gestions such as "articulate precisely the criterion for selection upon 
37. K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 451-452. 
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which you rely"Js and "mold your presentation to fit the articulated 
standard" apply equally to all Supreme Court litigation. For the 
most part, techniques and strategies of Supreme Court practice sim-
ply do not vary between constitutional and nonconstitutional 
litigation. 
Ripple's comments are misleading regarding the remedial dif-
ferences between constitutional and nonconstitutionallitigation. If 
different principles were to govern interim relief for constitutional 
and nonconstitutional wrongs, one would expect that a litigant 
seeking interim relief from a denial of constitutional rights would 
have a higher claim than other applicants for such relief. Ripple 
asserts, however, that school board applications to stay school de-
segregation orders "are a particularly good example" of the need for 
interim relief to avoid social disruption. His appendix of chambers 
opinions on requests for interim relief shows, however, only one ex-
ception to the Justices' general practice of denying school board re-
quests for stays of school desegregation orders.39 This is one 
instance where Ripple's apparent views seem to skew his descrip-
tion of the case law. 
Chapter 1 emphasizes the importance, in constitutional litiga-
tion, of characterization of the facts and the issues. Ripple argues 
that characterization in constitutional cases is "significantly dissimi-
lar" from "private law cases" from the vantage points of subject 
matter and methodology. No doubt the Court's approach differs in 
some cases. But in many instances the analysis differs not at al1.40 
Perhaps, as Ripple suggests, 
38. Id. at 461. One other note on chapter 12: it treats only the strategy of the party 
seeking review; much could also be said of the techniques of warding off Supreme Court 
review. 
39. Id. at 534. The one stay the appendix shows was granted, Columbus Bd. of Educ. 
v. Penick, 439 U.S. 1348 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978), resulted in yet another year's 
intentional segregation of the schools, remedied only after the Supreme Court affirmed the 
concurrent findings of the district court and court of appeals that school officials had engaged 
in a policy of systemwide racial segregation. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 
(1979). Compare Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969). 
40. Compare, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, (1976) (statutory), and 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (constitutional). In Gi/ben the outcome turned on 
whether the Court viewed the disability system as an insurance package which insures some 
risks and not others (and equally includes risks incurred by men and women alike), or as 
excluding a risk incurred only by women while not excluding risks incurred only by men. 
The statutory analysis was governed by the analysis of the similar issue in Geduldig. Simi-
larly, in Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978), the 
majority opinion's characterization of the issue leads inevitably to its conclusion: "whether 
the existence or nonexistence of 'discrimination' is to be determined by comparison of class 
characteristics or individual characteristics." This statutory case is used to illustrate issues of 
constitutional law in casebooks. E.g., E. BARRETT & W. COHEN, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 
835 (6th ed. 1983); G. GuNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 885n.3 (lOth ed. 1980). 
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generality and ambiguity are inherent in the process of characterization in the con-
stitutional case. . . . [F]luidity is the major characteristic which distinguishes the 
constitutional case from its common law and statutory cousins and must always be 
the chief concern of the constitutionallitigator.41 
More likely neither the constitutional case nor its common law and 
statutory cousins can be so pigeon-holed. Imaginative characteriza-
tion, based on careful study of the precedents, is an important tool 
of the litigator in much litigation, whatever the subject matter. 
Ripple scores more accurately in chapter 13's excellent discus-
sion of stare decisis. It is helpful for the practitioner to know that 
stare decisis carries less weight in constitutional litigation than in 
cases of statutory construction or common law. But no text can 
teach a practitioner how and when to mount an attack on seemingly 
settled constitutional doctrine. Who could have predicted that, in 
Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, the Supreme Court would 
repudiate "at least 28 cases, spanning well over a century of this 
Court's jurisprudence, proclaiming instead that federal courts have 
no power to enforce the will of the States by enjoining conduct be-
cause it violates state law?"42 As a lawyer for one of the parties, I 
can only admire the audacious prescience of defense counsel, who 
tied together the Court's flirtations with expanding the meaning of 
the eleventh amendment, the Court's prior indications43 of disquie-
tude over the extensive structural relief in the case, and its obvious 
desire to avoid the substantive federal constitutional issues relating 
to liability. 
v 
In sum, Ripple provides the practitioner with a good beginning 
point.44 Although the treatise slights some important issues, it 
alerts the practitioner to other issues which will need to be more 
thoroughly explored in the case law and in the recognized treatises. 
The novice litigator, faced with his first major constitutional case, 
will gain valuable insights at each stage of litigation. 
Constitutional litigation does differ in some important respects 
from other litigation. Exposure to those differences, whether of 
substance, procedure, or nuance, should help the lawyer structure 
the case properly from the outset. 
41. K. RIPPLE, supra note 7, at 19-20. 
42. 104 S. Ct. 900, 922 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
43. Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. I (1981). 
44. Ripple's text is well laid out, with frequent subheadings and ample indexing. Foot-
notes, however, appear at the end of each chapter, necessitating frequent page turning. His 
"case histories" often underscore points effectively. 
